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THE CONCEPTION OF GOD IN MODERU PHILOSOPHY
(A Presentation of the Views of Josiah Royce,Henri Bergson,W1li1am
J ames and H.G. Wells)

H.A.Bas111us

The two conoepts,religion and philosophy,are two opposite
poles of reasoning: The one clings to revelation for its source
and authority while the other finds its basis in speoulation,sometimes preceded by observation. When speaking of the conception of
God"in philosophy,we must,therefore,diseooiate from our minds the
popular religious oonnotations · of the term. In religion the conception of God is usuall~t the st~ing point while in philosophy it
is,at best,a primary means. The difference is very well carried
out in the· worde of Prof.Wright,who in his STUDENT'S PHILOSOPHY

OF RELIGION writes the following:
The_conception of God is employed,not for the purpose
of sentiment and devotion,but in the endeavor to understand the
universe,and man•s relation to it. The symbols of physics are
justifiable,because through them man is enabled to some extent to
understand and control physical conditions. The symbol of God
is justifiable in philosophy,provided that througn it man is better able to understand and adapt himself to the world in which
he li~es; otherwise not."
11

We see,thel,1ore,tha.t to ~hilosophy God is merely a symbo1
of expression which mi ght be compared to\the algebraic •x•; and,as
the nx11 varies according to the equation in which it is employed,
so also the symbol of God varies according to the system of phi1osophy in which it is included. Bchtolasticiam sought and succeeded.
for a long time in standardizing the symbol,but with its overthrow
the wildest vagaries became current. Prof.C.A.Beckwith of Chicago
describes and accounts for this variance with the words:
°From a condition of almost complete rigidity the idea
of God is becoming to a high degree plastic. Many innovating conoeptions of God are not only put forth,but are receiving wide and
serious consideration. In this it simple shares the movement whiah
has overtaken all ideas. Various causes have conspired to this result •....• and perhaps more influential than all ••.• interesta (1a)
the desire to find some interpr~tation of reality which shall approximately express the reaction of experience to the infinite
mystery of the world.• (p.64)
If the above mentioned flux is characteristic of all
philosophy,then it is particula~ly true of modern ph1losophy,wh1ch

__ _

__________________

__,

we may arbitrarily define as philosophy since 1860,the year fn
whioh Schopenhauer,the last of the Kantians,died and upon whose
death began the great struggle between idealism and naturalism,wh1ch
characterizes modern philosophic thought. From t hese two major divisions innumerable variations arose in the course of time. We cannot trace all of these in our paper,not even the most prominent. We
do,however,touch upon a lea ding thinker of both England and the Continent as well a s t wo friendly enemies in American philosophy,namely
H.G.Wells,Henri Bergson,Josiah Royce and William James.
In defining the scope of our paper,we have tried to hold before
ua several very general objectives. I~ accordance with our thesis
we shall,of course,treat the religious speculations of the above
na111ed philosophers. We shall nevertheless also show the roots of
the respective s ystems from which these speculations take their
source. We shall also attem~to show the endeavors of harmonizing-if the expr eEsion may be pardoned-religio-philosophic thought with

the subst'ig'ta of revea led. religion together with the fact of and
cause for the i nevitable failure of such attempts. And finally,we
hope to point out on the basis of our study a definite and constructive value accruing from philosophioo-religio•s study. We shall,
however,despite objectives,endeavor to assume an entirely objective
attitude in t he presentation of the subject matter,leaving the facts
in the case to speak for themselves.
Harvard University was for a long time the seat of the great
major
American philosophers,and practically every/branch of modern thought
was represented by one or the other of the luminaries occupying
Harvard's chairs of philosophy among whom were numbered Santayana,
Perry,Royoe and Wm.James. It is Prof.Ralph Barton Perry,who baa aaewned the role of historiographer for this famous group,a.nd we sba11
have occasion to refer to his writings from time to time.
In speaking of his colleague Royce,who is regarded as being

.)'.=" - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -America• a formeoet exponent of Absolute Idealiam,Prof.Perry recounts a

n second

wave of Kantian influence• which II came in America,

as in England,in the form of the introduction of Hegel•. And Hegel,
he says,marks the beginning of American idealism of which Josiah

Royce was the leading proponent. Royce•s · philosophy always retained,
according to Perry,a "naturalistic and empirical flavor",which fact,
blended with subsequent influences abroad,is easily accounted for
in Royce•s u l timate conclusions. Josiah Royce was born in California
in 1855 and was educated at the University of California before
going to Germany, where he came under the influence of Lotze, Schopenhauer,Ka,nt and Schelling. He spent the remainder of bis life,
teaching philosophy at Harvard from 1882 till 1916,.tlle year of his
demise.
It is interesting to note from our point a£ view the.t,among
various obj ectives,Royce sought for a philosophical interpretation
of Christianity,which was prompted by intense social interests as
well as early reli gious training. When meeting this thought,we
immediately hearken back to Thomae Acq'Q.!nas and the Scholastics,
for they sought the same goal which motivated Royce•s speculattions;
and we find t hat both have much in common from the fact that their
methods were alike idealistic. Royce's efforts in the religious
field are well attested to by such prominent works as THE RELIGIOUS
APSECT

OF PHILOSOPHY (1885), THE CONCEPTION OF GOD(1897), and THE

PROBLEM OF CHRISTIANITY (1913).
As was previously·· stated,Royce was idealistically inclined,
and that trend of thought assumes that •the word 'idea• means simply

an, adequate grasp

of reality•. Royce,bowever,blended his naturalis-

tic and emplirical tendencies with his maj'S\91 inclinations by stressing the reality of ideas. He came to regard reality aa •the fulfilment of ideas", and from this premise he proceded to evolve the
Absolute whose na.me his system bears.

•
We have stated that Royce bad strong social leaninga,and
Prof.Wright of Da.rt~outb sees in them tb~s~ting point for the
•

developement of bis system. Wright writes:
1 The

fact of the mental isolation and moral uniqueness of
every human being on t he one hand, with the fact that his knowledge
and hie duties bring him into organic relationship with other human beings,and with the physical universe on the otber,lead to the
conolueion\t;hat the universe as a whole must be an organic whole,
unified in the knowledge and will of an Absolute Mind." (p.382)
In looking about him,Royce noticed that,although we all ~partake of the same reality,observing the same phenomena with the
sBl:le sensory organs and synthesizing our sensations with the same
mental process,yet no man can know the _thoughts of another. We are
very similar; s~ill we are distinctly and inviolably separate.
Assuming then that 1) "reality must fulfill!!! idea.an,
and 2) "ther e can be no facts that are not experienced" ,Royce reasoned the following from his observations noted above: Reality 1a
a completely r a tiona l ordered whole,no part of which can exist alone. We morta l s know only parts of reality. Could we ever secure
complete knowledge of reality,then idea and its object would be
identical. Since,however,reality is a completely rational ordered
whole,there must be a uoint somewhere which serves as the junction
for complete knowledge an4omplete reality. This point or juncture
Royce termed t he Absolute. And this Absolute was his conception of God.
The conception of God as was advocated by Royce is best
presented in the book by that title- which contains the addresses·
of Profs.Royce,Le Oonte,Howison and Mezea delivered before the Ph1loeophioal Union at the University of California in 1895 (THE CONCEPTION OF GOD).

In the address noted above,Royce first sets out to lay down
a definition of God,and the result is the following:
God ia na being who is conceived as possessing to the full
all logically possible k:nowledge,insight,wisdom •••• This conceived
attribute of omniscience •••• would involve •••• what is rationally
meant by OmnipotEp1ce,by Self-Ooneciousneas,by Self-Poasesaion--Jea,I shou,ld unh~itatingly add,by :.c;r:esa,by Perefction,by Peace.•
l - """ '.\..Ne~ ...~_n~~
.J-4.1~_, ~l,s;.t:l/:;w.

Royce is a dualist in the question of epistemology: He holds
that knowledge is comprised of thinking and experience. By thinking

we merely viaue.lize a possible experience,and thinking ia,therefore,
only the questioning concerning the nature of a certain experience.
From this we must conclude that questioning is characterized by the
divorce of idea from its object.
The answer to our questioning represents the experience which
verifies the idea, whose essence we defined as mere questioning; and
it is God who,by virtue of Hiij/ Omniscienoe,answera. All ideas with
God are verified by experience. This does not,however,mean that
God merely views an external world of foreign truth. No,He comprehends
all thought and experience in Himself; ~e thinks and experiences
with us; and then He answers our questioning. Hence,Royoe concludes,
God's Omniscience must involve,besides Omnisoienoe,all the other divone attributes mentioned above. Technically expressed,He possesses
nAbsolute Experience" and "Absolute Tl;lought 11 ,i.e.,a wholly complete
and self-contained Experience and Thought needing no oorament,aupplement or correction. 1.{oreover, these Absolutes are not disjointed, but
completely organized as to their oonnectiona,so that a perfect whole,
a single system of ideas results. It is,indeed,God who is this Ab-

solute Mind (Logos,Problem Solver,World Interpreter,All-Inclusive
Self)."Through Him we share in the understanding and appreciation
of the meaning and purposes of a common world. 11 He is in time and
eternal,perceiving events as they follow in our consciousness and
also the entire succession as a totum simul.
Having verified the positied definition,Prof.Royce determines to prove it. When we speak of our experience,he says,wep,ttribute it to reality,and it follows that,by recognizing our experience as fragmentary,we imply 11 an absolutely organized.experience,
in which every fragment finds its place•. We might categorize thia
argument as one by implicat~on.

Royce e.dmits,however,that in speaking of reality and an Absolute Experience we are talking of mere conceptual objectsPlatonic ideas,as it were,and the question now arises,is the Absolute Experience real? The opposition claims that it is not real,
because it cannot be experienced. Royce,however,proves himself equal to the occasion by exhibiting a dialectical adroitness worthy
of a Master of Novices of the Society of Jesus; for he maintains
that

II

every effo:?:t to deny an Absolute Experience involves, then, the

actual assertion of such an Absolute Experienoen. His complete argument is best presented by direct quoting:
"If every reality has to exist.just in so far as there is
experience of its exi stence, then the ~erinination of the world of
experience to be t his world and no other,the fact that reality contains no other f a cts t han these,is,as the supposed final reality,
itself the obj ect of one exoerience,for which the fragmentariness
of the finite world appears.as- a presented and absolute fact,beyond which no reality is to be viewed as even genuinely possible.
Fo:?: this final experienoe,the conception of any possible experience
beyond is known . a s an ungr ounded conceotion,as an actual impossibility. But so,this fi nal experience
by hypothesis forthwith
defined as One,as all-inclusive,as determined by nothing beyond
iteelf,as assured of t he comnlete fulfilment of its own ideas concerning what is,---in brief,1.t becomes an absolute experience.• (p.43)

ls

The relation of t his Absolute Experience to our own experience, which is fini~e,1s regarded by Prof.Royce as the relation of
nan organic whole to its own fragments 0 •
This conception of God was belie~ed by the Harvard idealist
to be the true philosophic conoeption,a fact obvious from the terminology which he applied to God. With the term "Absolute Experience•
he uses int.erchangeably the expressions "Absolute Self" ,"Absolute
Thought",holding that they are merely different aspects of the same

.

truth,for,he says,~God is known as Thought Fulfilled; as Experienoe
absolutely organized,so as to have an ideal unity of meaning; as
Truth transparent to itself; as Life in absolute accordance with
idea; as Selfhood eternally obtained". (p.45f.)
But Josiah RoY.ce,as all idealistic philosophers,had al.so
.to solve thw p:;roblem of evil and .zonize it wit~ his system. '?his

~;~ ~
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and struggle (the various inf~rmities of life) appears as a pa.rt
of a whole in whose wholeness the fragments find their true place,
the ideas t heir realizat1on,the seeking its fulfilment,and our whole
e

life its truth,and so its etrnal rest----that peace which trans-

"

cends the storm of its agony and its restlessness.• (p.47) It is,
according to t his theory our very finiteness,the bitterness and
infirmity and incompleteness of life which manifest the glory and
existence of God,i n that these fragments of the Absolute imply
its reality. In fact,evil is not merely something to be born with
regret; it i s ab solutely neces sary in this world,in order that God

may triumph. Thus, f or ins tance,some idealists find a substantiating
parallel in the hi stony of the Churoh,in so far as they mai~n
that t he pass ion of Christ was es sential,in order that the spiritualization of the Church mi ght follow. They regard the apparently
evil world as har monious to God in His infinity,or,more candidly,

~
Vo

God even en joys our suff ering. A logical conclusion would be that ~

>e·
~~

we in i mmortality shall a lso partake of this seemingly unjust joy.f!:1
And,although Royce does not openly profess belief in this immortality, many s cholars cla im tha t it is consistent with his thought
and hence pronounce hi s s ytem complete.

~
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As a n aftermath,Prof. Royce pr~sents an apology for his con~ ~ •

~ot;

ception of God to Christiana. He identifies his speculatively con"'-".!:.. O
Z
<!!-:,
ceived deity with the one vaguely defined by Aristotle in an a:iuall! o
speoulat~ve .manner. The Christian God,1.e.,Fulfilled Thought or
Self-poss~ssed Experience,he statea,has long been placed in oppoai~
tion to hie concept of God,the Absolute Experience. But it rema.ined

for Christian mysti.cism to harmonize the two,defining and correlating
them as "the God of practical faith" (Christian) and "the God of
philosophic definition" (Idealistic). And he passes the palm to
st.ihomas Acquinas in whose work he believe the reconciliation to
have been oulmillj,ted. Although ex,pres sing himself as impatient with
~ . . / , /~ ~.8Atl41,Jr.;,t ~
, •

8.

represented in the historical faith•,Royoe stoutly maintains that he
is not a pantheist but distinctly theistic, and that all Biblical attributes of God may exactly be predicated also of hdis conception of
God as the Absolute.
Nor is Royce alone in the la.st stated position. Representative
of the agreement which a -nu.'llber of other philosophical scholars accord to him in t he matter is the following statement of Prof. Wright:
"The conception of Go~a.dvocated by Royoe •.••• satisfaotorily
validates prayer a.nd other forms of religious experience ••.•...•••.
In these experienoes,if we a ccept Royce's conception of God,we
can say that the individual i dentifies himself with the thought
and will of God. If it is i n some degree through gaining the viewpoint of God,the universal Self,that we are able to conununicate with
each other and know a common world,and if it 1s through our identity
with Him that we can unite in common loyalties,and if it is through
our common social exneri ence in the Church that we have learned to
know and apprecifl.te Christ, then surely we must conclude that it is
through God that we gain the spiritual reinforcement and other benefits afforded us in our religious experience." (p.386)
As a concluding remark to our comment on Josiah Royce's conception of God, we mi ght add that his conception is quite generally
regarded as the most brilliant and typical of the absolute idealists.
It i:s, i n line w i. th the same thought, likel",ise considered the sharpest
challenge t o the conceptions of a finite God which are advocated
by other Europea,n and American philosophers,a.s we shall ha.ve occa.-

sion to observe with the developement of our thesis.
In the man Royce we saw the social psyohologist,theorizer
and dialectician. In Henri Bergson,the French Jew,we have an opposite type,and,as we shall see,his philosophy is also characteristically opposite. Bergson was born in Paris in 1859 and began his
career as a mathematician and physicist. As is often the case,however,
with one who studies the

11

cold sciences• ,Bergson was piqued by the

insoluble mystery underlying material nature. He could not resist
the lure of metaphysics and eventually became a student

#

and

teacher of philosophy. After having published saeral books in this
field (TIJ.'1!: A1'ID FREE WILL; MATTER AND UEJ.IORY), he became professor
Rt thA nn11A~A nA Trenoe

1n J900. seven vears lat_er_ his chef-d 1 oeuvre

9.

appeared---OREATIVE EVOLUTION,which is regarded by ma.ny as •our
oe,atury I s first philosophic masterpiece".
We h&ve previously pointed out th&t modern philosophic thought
is oharoterized by the bitter struggle between idealism &nd naturalism,and at the beginning of the present century the time was ripe
for the deci 4ing struggle,in whioh Bergson was destined to play an
important role. Physicist and mataphysician,Bergson constituted
what in the American political parlance would be termed anl ideal
•compromise candidate". Nor was the French Je'fl missing from the_
front line of battle. He t hrew himself into the thick of the fray,
but his position was uni que in that he took no side but instead
attacked both comba t a.nts,and that successfully. The Elan Vital proved
fatal to the gross materialism as well as the intellectualism of the
age. Ber~son has often been likened to Kant,who fought the intellectualism which bega n with Locke and ended with Hume. Da.rwin had revived the ancient dragons whom {ant had slain,and Bergson now appeared on the scene to repeat the lethal mission of Kant.
Henri Bergson is generally classed as a French spiritualist,
viz.,one who holds the fundamental reality of the creative will; but
he also had natur~listio leanings. The failure of i ntellect to grasp
reality,he says,is a total failure,and he,therefore,repudiatea al1
conoeptu&l thought in favor of instinct and intuition. We note here
the influence of and similarity to Kant which we alluded to earlier,
and in this connection Seth Pringle-Pattison quotes Bergson as saying,
• if you read THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, you see that Kant has oritized not reason in general,but a reason fashioned to the habits and
exigencies of the Cartesian or Newtonian physics•. (p.48) Bergson
held that the intellect distorts reality,because reality is not ordered and rat:Honal to fit the concepts of the intelleot,but 1a rather
fluid,mobile,oontinuous,novel and perpetual. As such it can be grasped only in the flux of life • Seth Pringle-Pattison sums up this

10.
idea with the words: "The intimate appreciation of living experience

fmmma the basis of the whole Weltanschauung which be (Bergson) otters

ua'.(p.69) And Will Durant contrasts Bergson's idea of finding reality only in the flux of life to the action of the moving picture- oamera,which " divides i nto static poses the vivid current of realityR.

'We see matter a nd mi ss energy" (p.494),writes Durant,an~ in these
words he has swnmed up Bergson's criticism of the intellect in favor
of intuition.
Bergson, howeve r,is constructive and explains that the function
of the intellect i s d i ctated by the needs of practical life.

1 To

try

to fit a concept on a n ob ject is simply to ask what we can do with
the object,and wha t it can do with us. To label a certain object
:1th a certa in conc ept i s to mark in precise terms the kind of action
or attit ude the ob; ect should suggest to us". ( INTRODUafION TO METAPHYSICS, trans. ,p. 41). He holds that we conceptualize by mee.ns of
-t:c,

perception a nd memory,thi s dualism aiding us~decide what is best
under the circumstances. And our decision is based upon and ultimate., ly ef fected by our 9r a ct1ca1 needs in life.
The remedy for loosing ourselves from what we rnight call
the standardizing effect of the i ntellect 1s,according to Bergson,
very obvious and simple, na.r:1ely the putting aside of our pr11ctical
needs,which needs Ral ph Barton Perry describes as "objectifying ourselves and so bringing ourselves under the s!)8.t1aliz1ng,decomposiDg
and det er ministic categories of sc1enoe11 • Only in this way can

W8

attain the metaphysical insight of intuition,thus immediately becoming aware of that "duration wherein we aotn and wherein •our atatea
melt into each other". (MATTER AND ME&ORY,trans.,pp.241,243-4)
Intelle9t and intuition are,bowever,meconciled by the tact
that intellect does not f~lsify rea lity by contrarineslf>ut rather
by distortion in so far as intellect aelects,in the making of oonoepts,from reality a~oording to its ~raotioal neede,lea ving wba.t

11.
raaina because i~ is not required for action. Intuition on the o-

ther hand experiences reality as a totum simul ••
Having deduced from the fact of the failure of intellect properly to perceive reality the further fact that reality is not a
constant but a flux,and having also reconciled the dua~iam of intellect and intuition,Bergson now prooedes to explain re'\fity with
still another of t he dualisms with which his sytem abounds. Reality
for him consists of l i fe and matter,a premise deducible from the
idea of flux. Bot h are,hcmever, mere aspects of the ea.me reality provided t hat we consider reality as na movement or activity which h&s
different degrees of i ntensity". Life,he holds,represents reality
as "gathered all at once into a moment of creation,or focussed to
a point of pure a.ctiv1ty11 ; matter is the aspect of reality when

11

it

tends to relax and di s solve,and then become rr1ore repetitive,homogeneoue and stagnant". It is the reconciliation of these two aspects
of reali ty,so apparent in .natural evolution,which lead to that famous inve11tion of · Eergson,the Elan Vital,whioh he describes as a
vital i mpulse repr esenting the fight of creative life against tbe
inertia of matter. From the struggle between the effort of life to
maintain and increase 1 tself au1idst the drag and inertia of materiality, everything has and still does evolve. Life becomes victor in
the struggle by storing up energy which can be explosively released.
This is,for instance, a very ·obvious phenomenon in the evolution of
plant life. The storage of energy culminates in animals in •instinct•
and in huma.n beings in

II

intelligencen. Thus in the endless struggle

of the Elan Vital everything evolves. This 1s,briefly,the conception of creative evolution as it was understood by Bergson.
Bergaon•s cosmogony is now complete with the exception of a
God. But his God follows,or rather precedes,acoording to the point
of view,his entire thought. The persistently creative life from
the Elan Vital to intellegenoe is GodJ Will Du.rant happily phrases

12.

Bergaon•a deity as follows:
"This persistently creative .life,of which every individual and
every species is an experiment,is•what we mean by God; God and Life
are one. But this God. is finite,not omnipotent,---limited by matter,
and overcoming its inertia painfully,step by step; and not omniscient,
but groping gradually towards knowledge and consciousness and •more
light 1 • n (p. 502)
Durant continues by quoting from CREATIVE EVOLUTIOH,p.248:

1 0od,

thus defined,has nothin~ of the ready-made; He is unceasing life,aotion,freedom. Oreation,so conoeived,is not a mystery; we experience
it in ourselves when ,, e act freely. 11

•

Durant's method of drawing an apparently correct conclusion of
Bergson's conception of _God on the basis of several seemingly clear
sentences from t he works of t he philosopher himself is very characteristic of a leg ion of scholars in attempting to determine an inevitable oonclusion to which Berg son's philosophy might lead. Durant
finds i n Bergson's thought a finite God,much akin to Wm.James• conception as we shall see later,and utter-ly irreconcilable with the
God of Christianity. We find,kowever,in the extensive literature covering Bergson's t hought,an even more extensive variation of opinion
as to his conception of God. The subject is perhaps best presented
in the book BERGSON AND RELIGION by Lucius Hopkins Hiller,assistant
professor of Biblical i nstruction in Princeton University. Hiller
covers this range of differing opinion by professing the belief that
Bergson's conception of God is consistent even with the Christian
conception, somewhat modified.
In reviewing the widely divergent opiniona,we note that Bergson has been accused of pantheism. Charles Oorbiere,for example,in
the REVUE DE THEOLOGIE,1910,writes the following:
•Bergson ascribes to God consciousness and liberty but only
in a vague way •.••• Life alone is clear and God is hardly more than
the central hearth of the universe's energy ••••• He is ent1re1y immanent ••••• Bergson•s conception leads to pantheism.•
And Prof.liiller,1n meeting the attaok,oonfesses that much
of Bergson's writing is ambiguous,and,therefore,of a qua11ty eaa11y

adaptable to pantheism. He cites as an example of ambiguity,adaptable
to pantheism, the follo" ing from CREATIVE EVOLUTION:
•Life as a whole,from the initial impulse that thrust it into
the world,will apuear a s a wave which rises •...• This rising wave
is consciousness.: ••• On flows the current,running through human
generations,subdividing itself into individuale ••••• Thue souls •••••
are nothing else than the lit tle rills into which the great river
of life divi4es itself7flowi ng through the body of humanity.•
We see that it certainly would not be unjust to maintain that
the sub-lined words con~ain pantheism. Prof.Uiller,however,reoalls
Uuirhead.•s caution regarding "driving Bergson's language too ha.rd".
Miller mainta ins that one must read CREATIVE EVOLUTION •in the light
of its material a nd aim" ,remembering that Bergson waged war also against certain dogmatics of t heistic religion,which,together with the
natural diff iculty of p enning a description of his unique Vital Impulse without the use of t heological terminology,made the avoidance
of absolute ambi guity almost impossible.
Bergson has a lso been called pluralist because of the many dualsima which a re to be found in his system,partioularly the dualism
of mind and matter alt hough Bergson traces these latter two to a
common origin. Sir Oliver Lodge takes this point of view when,writing
in OU~REHT LITERATURE,April, 1912,he says:
"I am i mpressed with two things----firet,with the reality and
activity of powerful but not almighty helpers, to whom we owe guidance and management a nd reasonable control: and next,with the fearful majesty of still higher aspects of the Universe,infinitely beyond our ut1noet possibility of thought.•
On the basis of the facts noted by the Englishma.n,one must
admit that the charge of pluralism against Bergson is also tenable.
There are several writers,however,who exonerate the FrenchJewish thinker not only of pantheism,but also of pluralism,and some
even categorize his sytem as monistio. Thus,for instance,H.C.Corranoe
in the HIBBERl' JOURNAL of January,1914 writes that "Bergeon•a Creator
is imrnanent in nature,but not,like the god of panthe1am,ident1o&1
with it•. Prof. Miller is heartily in accord with this opinion. Uu.1.rhead,whom we mentioned before,likewise writing in the RIBBER? JOURBAL,

14.

this time of July, 1911, takes a more definite stand in the matter, as
follows:

•so

far from resting in any facile pluraliam,he (Bergson) is

led by the very de"Oths of hie own monism to reject the current state-

ments of it. His philosophy may be said to be in reality an appeal
from a shallower to a deeper form of unity. 11
Le Roy,t he Ca tholic modernist defender of Bergson,even finds

a personal God in Bergson's philosophJ. Referring to Bergson in the
REVUE ~'EO-SCOLASTIQUE (cf. N. Balthasar),November,19O7 and February,
1908,he states hi s opinion thus:
'We cannot rega r d the source of our life otherwise than persoimpersonal. We seek in Him our personality. God is p ersonal in that He is the source of our personality.
He is i mmanent in us but also transcends us and also the world.•

nal. We cannot . rega r d Hi m v

And in a letter by Bergson in ANNALS OF CHRISlIAN PHILOSOPHY,
also quoted by Le Ro y in A NEW PHILOSOPHY: HENRI BERGSOB,monistio
and

personal i nclina tions may be found although the statement on

..

Which t his opi nion i s based is vague and indefinite. Bergson writes:
1

The cons i de rations set forth in my ESSAY ON THE I MMEDIATE
FACTS OF CONSCI OUSNESS (Time a nd Free Will) are intended to bring
to light the fact of liberty; t hose in MATTER AND m~dORY touch
upon t he rea lit y of spirit; thase in CREATIVE EVOLUTION present
creation as a fact. From all this we derive a clear idea of a free
and creating God, p roducing matter and life at once,whose creative
effort is continued,in a vital direction,by the evolution of spe0
cies and t he construction of human nersonalities.
..
Much more definite evidence that Bergson c·onsidered himself
a monist is presented in an interview with Bergson by Louis Levine,
published in the NEW YORK TIMES,February 22,1914,and also very widely
quoted:
"This source of Life (God) is undoubtedly spiritual. Is it
personal? Probably. There are not sufficient data to answer this
question,but Professor Bergson is inclined to think that it is
personal. It seems to him that personality is in the very intention of the evolution of Life,and that the human personality is
just one mode in which this intention is realized.
It is,therefore,very probable that the spiritual source of
life whence our personality springs should be personal in itself.
Of oouree,personal in a different way,without all those accidental.
traits which in our mind form part of personality and which are
bound up with the existence of body. But personal in a larger sense
of the term----a spi~itual unity expressing itself in the creative
process of evolution:•
1

15.

On the basis of the evidence cited above,Prof.Miller seeks to
prove the monism of Bergson•syiew. He first makes the Kantian distinction between deist and theist, quoting the Sage of Koenigsberg as saying that

II

the deist believe that there is a God; the theist that

there is a living God11 (the former is purely rational,but the latter
is connected with revela tion). He also recalls that Baldwin's DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY defines theist as one who thinks of God •as a
Being who,by i nt elligence and freedom,as originator of the cosmos,
contains within Hirnself the ground of all things. He thinks of God
as entering i nto persona l relations with men; as the Controller of
t he World whose cours e He directly affects". Hence,Prof . J!iller would
maintain t hat Bergson is a theist. He goes even further than that,
for he believes t hat Bergson's position is compatible with Christian
utiJX theism a lthough he admits that certain difficulties present

t he1nselves i n t lJ e r econciliation, e.g., the fact that Bergson rules
out 11 tbeologica.l finalism".
Whet her ~iller•s conviction is tenable or not remaina,of
course,a moot question; on the other band,however,it must also be
admitted that hi s position cannot be disproven. The line of ieast
resistance,in t his case evn more tempting than usual,would be to assume with Prof. Hora ce Meyer Kallen of the University of Wisconsin
that in t h e philosophy of Bergson raa.y be found the fin1 te God of
James, the Christian God of the Old and New Testaments and the Absolute God of .the philosoph~rs.
It s eems,however,that the general indefiniteness of Bergson's
system makes it practically impossible definitely to establish his
actual conception of God. He himself,it seems,professes a mon1st1o
and even theistic belief. As regards his wr1t1ngs,however,1t might

be best to admit thefpteB~b111ty of all ten\able implications and
.,

await further word from Bergson or one of his disciples whiob w11~

eliminate the flexibility.

.,,
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We have eo far in our thesis treated the systems of a prominent
rrenchman and an equally prominent American, Let us add to these the
philosophy of William Jamee,and we shall have a completed triangle;
for James was the antithesis of Royce and at the same time the American
complement of Bergson whom he admired and from whom he received

a

direct stimulus for much of bis thought.
Wm.Ja:mes was born in New York in 1842 and was the brother of
the slightly less prominent Henry James. Durant mentions the well
known saying wbioh,I tbink,originated with the American 1iterary critic John Uacy to the effect that while Henry James wrote stories in
psychology,his brother William wrote psychology in stories. The fact
remains that both of the boys were devoted to psychology,which fact
may perhaps be regarded a.a either the direct result or,on the other
band, the ree.otion to the swedenborgian mysticism to which their faL

tber was addicted. The brothers studies f,rst in this country and
then in France whereupon William returned to America and took his
li.D. degree at Harvard in 1870. He remained at Harvard as a teacher
till his death in 1910. He,as did Bergson,began his work with the
physical sciences but could not resist the Oircean lure of Metaphyoics,and he successively taught classes in anatomy,physiology,paychology and finally philosophy. He wrote and published a number of widely known books among wl,ich the most widely read are THE PRINCIPLES
OF PSYCHOLOGY (1890)---this is regarded as his masterpiece and ia
a standard work in the pragmatic field---THE WILL TO BELIEVE (1897),

VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EX~ERIENOE (1902),PRAG}JATISll (1907) and A PLURALISTIC UNIVERSE (1909).
Some of the titles of James• _works have beoome termini technioi
in t he philosophic system which he built; tbus,far example,pragmatiam
and pluralism,with radical empricism i■serted,might be said to cover,

in a general way,the philosophic thought of Jamea. Durant defines
,pragmatism thus:

17.
"Instead of asking whence an idea is derived,or what are its
premises,pragmatism examines its results; it •shifts the emphasis
and looks forward•; it is •the attitude of looking away from first
thinga,principles,categoriee,euppoeed necessities~and of looking
towards last things,fruits,oonsequenoes,faots•.• \p.558)
Prof.Wright explains the idea similarly by defining the so-called
'pragmatic test• with these words:
1 The

simple test of the truth of a proposition is the observation of the practical consequences that logically follow from its
aooeptance; it is verified,if action upon it is followed by the coneequenoes that could rea sonably be expected to follow•.
The i dea of pragmatimn is considered uniquely American because
of its passion for

11

results11 ; and,a.lthough its roots may be found in

Kant's CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON,in Schopenhauer,in Darwin's
survival of the fittest,in t he utilitarianism of Spencer and Uill,
it may well be sa id to be mostly the suggestion of

11

the American scene•.

By r adical empricism is meant the attempt to fathom the flux
and continuit y of life as this was advocated by Henri Bergeon,and
which is known only by sensory experience.
Sensory experience,according to James,postulates a pluralism,i.e.,
that the world i s an unf inished product in which we must continue to
fi ght for the good. "Compromise and mediation are inseparable from
the pluralistic philosophy",says James,and on the basis of these words
he seeks to develope- a God who meets the pragmatic test most suooeaafully,viz.,a God who fits best into the world-picture,or who

1

is &t

once most probable on theoretical grounda,and most rational in the
broa.de~ sense of making a 'direct appeal to all those powers of our
nature which we hold in high esteem 1 • 1 (Perry,PRESEN'l' PHILOSOPBIOAL
TENDENCIES,p.370f.)
Jam~s claims a vague affinity with Luther and,before him,St.Paul
in his piu~alistic speoulation,for he holds that they were the first
to realize that n you are strong only by being weak••. .. You cannot
live on pride or $elf-suff1cingness. There is a light in which al:--~
the naturally founded and currently accepted dist1not1one,exce11enaea

•

18.

and safe-guards of our characters appear as utter childishness. Sincerely to give up one 1 s own conceit or hope of being good in one•s
own right is the only door to t he universe's deeper reaches.• (A PLURALISTIC U!UVERSE,p.3O4). Man,according to James,must aoknowle~e

.

something greater outside of him,a tacit reply· to intuition,as it
were; and. this something he calls n religious consciousness". He places
it beyond the world of logical understanding,invoking thereby the
shadow of Immanuel Kant, a.nd also beyond the world of logical experience
and even psychological experience. "In a word11 ,he writes,"the believer
is continuous,to his own consciousness,at any rate,with a wider self
from which saving exp eriences flow in.n (Op.cit. ,p.3O7)
In defining t hi s wi der self,James first of all repudiates the
Christian conception of God, a nd also the conception of God that is
advocated by t he i dea listic pantheists. He refers to the Christian
conception as the God of Soholasticism and says that it is •a pretentious sham •••.• It means les s than nothing, in 1 ts pompous robe of
adjectiv,esyexemplified in the definition,"Deus est Ens,a se,extra et
supra omne genus, neeesaarium, unum, infinite perfectum, simplex, immutabile,
i mr11ensum,aeternum, i ntelligens", etc •• (PRAGl.tATIS}.I,p.121). Durant says
that Scholasticism asks, what is a thing? and loses itself in nquiddities", and likewise James maintains that it pictures God and hia
creation 11 as entities distinct from each other" and

II

still leaves

the human subject outside of the deepest reality in the universe•.
(THEISTIC OONCEPr ION OF GOD,p.25)
The conception of God which wae held by his colleagu.e Royce,
and which we developed earlier,he regarded as the culmination o~ the
views of Spinoza,Fiohte and Hegel; he condemned this view,which he

held to be pantheistic, on intellectual and moral grounds. In the first
place,by profes sing a Perfect Absolute,he said,one cannot account for
II

the obvious ignora.nce,misery and sin 11\ the world except by the poor

19.
evasion that they are only limitations,privations and non-existent.
He regarded its exponents as being.so drunk with abstractions as to
be imnervious to concrete realities. And in the second plaoe,he believed "the moral holidays" which a panthei tic God 1 whose universal
immanence will infallibly ineure,regardless of their own failures
and shortco111ings, the salvation of the whole universe" to be a ooafession of i ndolence.Philosophers must choose between religious pantheism
·and anti-pant heistic mora lism in order satisfactorily to solve the
problem of evil, a nd J ames chose moralism,holding that no monism could
solve t he problem of evil a nd that
any absolute religion is moni sm11 •

0

(

any absolute moralism is pluralism;

LITERARY REMAINS OF THE LATE HENRY

JAl1ES, p.118). J ames believed that everywhere choice was exercised in

life,and h e nce absolute moral ism is pluralism. It might in this connection be recalled that Durant distinguif.[lhed between

11

tender-minded•

(religiously inclined) tempera~ments and •tough-minded" (materialistic;
insistent u~on facts). James was both of these,and he regarded pluralism as t he only solution over and against the monism of absolute
religion.
Discarding both the Scholastic (Christian) and the pantheistic
(Absolute) ideas of God,James conceived a finite God who is a part
of the universe arid r.hom Theo.Flournoy,his interpreter,desoribea
according to our mortal needs,as follows:
What we need is a God who really•. exista,who is a personality
lying outside our own,and other than us,---a power not ourselves
and more powerful than we are; not a God of whom we speak in the
neuter g~pder and in the third person,aa of some general law,but a
God who~~ddress directly and intimately as 1 Thou•; not a distant
God enthroned,majestic and impaseive,on high,but a God who will descend into the dust and degradation,to suffer and to labor there,to
join us in our daily struggle a gainst the powers of evil and all the
obstacles arising in our path,a God who knows and appreciates our
ideals,and who collaborates with us and we with Bim to bring about
their realization. Now it is not monism,however idealistic it may
be,which can furnish us with such a God; but only pluralism.• (pp.146f.
11

ao.
James held that experience reveals to us a world unfinished and
imperfeot,one which is being painfully created through the cooperation
of its members. Only such a universe could offer opportunity for moral
action,and only in such a universe could we hope to meet that Helper
and Companion whom we need as God. And God must be finite,for He is
just another of t hose "each forms• who fights with us. Thus James
also sought to solve the problem of evil by proving evil to be,with
the good,an

intrinsic part of the universe,and a n element which man

and God coordina tely combat. Here we find both the pragmatistic and
the pluralistic i d eas in full sway.
And J ames• radica l empiricism answered that such a God,finite,
personal and striving,could be found here. He writes:
"The line of least res istance; the,as it seems to me, both i*heology and philosophy, is to a.cc·e pt, along with the su:9erhuman consciousness, the notion t hat it is not all-embracing, the notion, in other words,
that there is a God,but t ha t He is finite,either in power or i~ kn~wledge
or in both a t once. 11 (A PLURALISTIC UNIVERSE,p.~11)
...&..1;,,
And he now goes on to prove this contention from a·peculiar bit.
of experience. Religious pqenomena;he held,which intellect and science
cannot explain,attest to a superhuman intervention in human affM.ra
which is the finger of God. His studies of various forms of religious
experience, e.g., 11 healthy-mindedness" ( continuous growth) ,conversion,
saintliness a nd mysticism,led him to regard the above conclusion as
inevitable. It i s ,of oourse,based upon .the testimony of pantheistic
mystics,but James accepted it nevertheless because of its universal
character and also because it fitted so· perfectly with his pragmatic
tendencies despite much criticism from the •ultra-knowing". He held
that it was through the sub-conscious,so d~staateful to modern materialistic psychology,that religious experience ~eaohes the soul,and he
was su9ported in this view by a thinker,otherwise independent of him,
the Genenvese theologian,Oeisar Malan,who considered the sub-conscious
the basis of

11

all individual religious experience from the simp1e fee-

ling of moral obligation to the most esoteric experiences of Christian

21.
life.• (of.G.Fulliquet: LA PENSEE THEOLOGIQUE DE CESAR MALAN,Robert,

Geneva,1902,p.286) • .James argued that,although science cannot explain
t he ultimate source of t hese experienoes,the fact that they are aperienoe removes t · e possibility of their being anti-scientific. That
they do not recur according to

11

la.ws 11 1s also concurrent with James•

pluralism (althougn it eliminates the concept of the Absolute) since
to the empiricist

II

the perennial laws of science •.•.• are

nothing

more t han abstract formulae, save in the concrete instances where they
find t hemselves realized".
As t o ~het he r God Hi mself is a monism or a pluralism,James left
an. open que stion. He s eems,however,to tend to a polytheistic conception,a s ort of spirit ual hierarchy,although absolutely unlike the
pagan pa ntheon of old; f or he sa ys:
11

.r.ieanwhile the p r a ctical needs and experiences of religion seem
to me sufficiently met by t h e belief that beyond each man and in a
fashion continuous with him there exists a large power which is friendly to hi14 a nd t o hi s i deals. All t hat the facts require is that the
power should be both other a nd larger than our conscious selves. Anyt hing l a r ~e r will do,if only it be large enough to trust for the ne■t
step. It need not be infi nite,it need not be solitary. It might conceiveahly even be only a larger and more god-like self,of which the
present self ll!!ould t hen be but the mutilated expression, and the universe mi ght conceiveably be a collection of such selves,of different
degrees of i nclusiveness, wi th no absolute unity realized in it at all.
Thus would a sor t of polytheism return upon us, ••••• which,by the
way,has a l ways b een t he real religion of common people,and is so still
today. 11 (THE A:lIETI ES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIEMOE, pp. 524-6).
In su1nming u p his interpr etation of James• Ood,Flournoy makes
the startling st a tement that he confidently regards "James• personality and philosophy a s freely Christian in spirit"; and,although James
never professed any of the orthodox creeds

11

because of an innate dis-

like of theological for14ulaen, he often referretl to nwe Christians• and
was in great sympathy with the

11

deeper e1notions of the great figures

of Christianity". Flournoy,however,regards James• ph1losophio ideas
as being in accord even with the Scriptures,stating that Christ was
really the first pragmatist when he declared that •by your fruits ye
shall know them"; the.t Christ treated the problem of evil pluraliati-

as-.--~-------~-------~-0&111,as does Ja.meEJ; and that Obrist did not teach an •Absolute• God
but rather the

II

Father", the great Ally who desires our welfare and

who demands only our cooperation in resisting and casting out all evil. Flournoy believes that

II James•

theism remains true in fundameni,

tale to evangelical theism" and concludes his treatise,as follows:
11

In leavi ng this subject I would point out once more that the
great idea. which dominates James• religous moralism,----that human
effort and divine power must collaborate for the salvation of the
world,----is after all no more than a develonement of the thought
of the Apostle: •we a.re la.borers together with God• • 11 (p.165)
Thus,as is often the case in philosophy,and as we saw particularly in the ca se of Bergson,we again meet with perplexity also in
defini ng t he J amesian conception of God. Only in one general point
can we be su r e, and t hat is t he fact that James,as was consistent
with hie pluralistic dootrine,developed a finite God who was virtually litt le more than a demi-god in opposition to the absolute qualities at t ributed to the Gods of both pantheism and Christianity.
~e shall next in our study turn to what may be called the practical application of philosophic

11

truths11 to religion by a quas1-

philosopher,in t a is case the very excellent writer of fiction,Mr.B.G.
Wells of Engl and.
Mr. Wells describes his religious convictions in GOD,THE INVISIBLE
KING, which book,we presume,wa.s supposed to be epoch-making as a synthesis of modern religious thought. In lµs preface he warns the •orthodox" against being shocked,for his· work precedes from the basis
that the Council of Nicea was insincere and that it foisted a figment
of Alexa ndrian thought upon mankind in the creed named after it,in so
far as it attempted -a compromise betwemGod the Creator and God the
Redeemer by manufacturing the Trinity. This compromise Wells regards
as a feature of all religions,and to him the relation of the Father
to the Son is nothing more than "a mystical metaphor". He confesses
a complete agnosticism of God the Creator,bu.t complete faith in God
the Redeemer; both of these profeseions,however,are to be uDderstood

Ul.le

in a peculiar Wellsia n sense which we shall develope as we procede.
~e aannot help but ascribe to Mr.Wells the stigma of Unitarianism,
traces of which seem very a pparent in his writings. And certainly he
is guilty of the basic principle of Unitarianis~,for he teaches a complete repudiation of all cr eeds,albeit a faith in God,whom he defines
as a Whimsical fancy dicta.tee, and who runs the gamut of rationalism
and religious s entimental! ty from Schleiermache:r to Harry Emerson

Fosdick.
This English t hi nker,wgo would meddle wita theology,forcibly
reject s t he Chri s tian conception of God as it was formulated .at Nicea.
He beli eves t hat the Emperor Constantine's desire for the unity of
t he real m t oget her wi th t he political ooportunities for the Church
v.•ere a t t he root of the Ni cean

II

compromise". The Christians were for-

ced into t he Tri ni tari a n oontroversy,a.ccording to llr.Wells,for the
• followi gn rea sons:
"The Chri s tia ns would neither admit tha t they worshipped more
gods t han one becau s e of t he Greeks, · nor deny the divinity of Ohrist
because of t he Jews. The y dr eaded to be polytheistic; equally did
t hey. dr ead t he lea st ao~a r ent detraction from the nower and imnortance
of t heir s aviour. They- were forced into the idea of the Trinity by
the neces sity of t hos e contrary assertions, a.nd they had to make :bt
a myst ery orot ected by curses to save it from a reductio ad absurdum. 1
(p.10)

-

Our frothing friend takes a final dig at all of the great &octrines of Chri s tianity by saying that they were the products of "theology by conuni ttees11 •
Following his apostacy,he introduces the new "revelation".
Wells has come to a rea lization of t he true God through experience,
a sta tement which sounds familiar to those of us who are acquainted
with t he history of rationalism. And this experience is,upon the basis of. comoarison
with a wide circle of acquaintances and in its ge.
neral aspecte,universal. Experience tells him that God is 1) finite,
an~not infinite; 2) Not the Life Force, Will to Live,or Struggle
for Existence; 3) an emanation from within and not from without man.
Wells ca lls this the "new religion", ,rhioh he re~arde as havi~g no

founder and no beginniDg,but being raFt/er · a proved universal experience,the consensus gentium,as it were. And he finds that man ha.a
come to a knowledge of this universal God by first feeling the •need
of Godn (an experience much akin to Christian contrition) whereupon
the "realization of God11 follows ( much as does Christian conversion).
This somewhat arbit~ary God the Bri~isher defines thus:
"God comes we know not whence,into the conflict of life. He
works in men a.nd t hrough men. He is a spirit,a single spirit,and
a single person; he ha s begun and he will never end. He is the immortal part and leader of mankind. He has motives,he has characteristics,he ha s an aim. He is by our poor scales of measurement boundless
love,boundless courage,boundless generosity. He is t hought and a
steadfast will. He is our friend and brother and the light of the
world. That briefly is the belief of the modern mind with regard to
God. There is no very novel i dea about this God,unless it be the idea
that he had a beginning. This is the God that men have sought and
·
found in all a.ges,as God or as the Messiah or the Saviour. The finding of him i e s a lvation from the purposelessness of life. 11 (p.18)
~e a r e led by t his and other statements to recognize the in~
.~luence of Gnostic lore and also of the philosophy of Wm.James upon
Mr. Wells• t hought. It ap~ea rs that the Englishman searched the history -of t he early Church with some assiduity and was influenced by
the Gnostic heresy with regard to the idea of the demi-urge,for his
conception of God resembles somewhat the demi-urge in its finiteness.
especially when Wells acknowledges an i ufini te which he calls the
Veiled Being and describes,as follows:
At the ba.ck of all things there is an impenetrable curtain;
the ultimate of existence is a Veiled Being,which seems to know
nothing of life or death· or good or ill. Of that Being,whether it
is simple or complex or divine,we know nothing; to us it is no more
t~n the limit of understanding,the unknown beyond. It may be of
practically limitless intricacy and possibility.• (p.14)
11

The indebtedness to Wl4.James and hie ide~ of a finite God
Mr.Wells freely and even proudly aoknowledgea when he boasts that
James was his great teacher. It appears that James• solution of the
problem of evil by means of a finite God appealed most to his pupil
Wells.
The defining process of Wells' God,however,involvea alao a
long 11st of negations,direoted,for the most part,against what ~Jeir

;:s::,.- - ~ ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - author regards as Christian misconceptions and delusions. The denials
are, briefly st~ted, the·se: God is not

II

somethin~ magic serving the

ends of_ men" , viz. , God cannot be conceived as One in whom 11 we 11ve
and move and have our being11 ; furthermore,God is not J3rovidenoe,nor
does He punish; He also does not revenge the onslaughts against the
believers as one might expect from the words "whoso shall offend one
of these little ones who believe in me,1t were better for p.im that
a mill-stone be hanged about his neck11 ,etc.; nor dees God "clamour
for the attention of children" ; and finally, God is not

n sexual•, viz.•

i mposing detailed sexual inhibitions~ la Levitioua,making marriage
a mystical sacrament and chastity supererogatory (sicl). We see that
this God of the

11

nev.r religion" is nothing but a bitterly executed

polemic against orthodox Christianity.
The positive a ttribute s which Mr.Wells ascribes to his God
are,to say the least,vague. We shall enumerate them with some little
comment a ccording to the author's whim: God is Courage,and to this
assertion t he novelist does not see fit to add. Courage,however,is
implied in the definition of God as a Person,the second attribute.
Wells writes:
God is a person who can be known as one knows a friend,who
can be served and who receives servioe,who partakes of our nature;
who is,like us, a being in conflict with the unknown and the limit- .
less and the forces of death; who values much that we val.ue and 1"s
against much that we are pitted against. He is our king to whom we
must be poyal; he is our captain,and to lmow him is to have a direction in our lives. He feels us and knows us; he is hel.ped and gladdened by us. He hopes and attempts ••••• God is no abst~aotion nor
trick of words,no Infinite. He is as real as a bayonet thrust or
an embraoe. 11 (pp.55f.)
11

God is further described as being immaterial and without body; "his nature is of the nature· of thought and will". God has nothing to do with matter and spaoe,but he exists in time even as
a current of thought does. God also cbanges,for "aJ.l our truth,all.
our intentions and achievements,he gathers to himslwf. He is the
undying human memory,the increasing human will.•. (p.61)
liodern religionists deny,however,that God is the

1

oolleot1ve

mind and purpose of the human race". He is not an aggregate,but a
synthesis,much as a Temple is more than a mere aggregate of stones,

~07.-----------------------,
or a regiment a mere aggregate of soldiers. The third attribute of
God is Youth. He

II

began and is always beginning. He looks forever

into the future". God is not a patriarch, past his prime, as per the
ff

conventional Christian represetation
(sicJ); He grows with us. Last
/1,
of all,God is Love. And Wells calls God's love an "austere love1 ,for
it is ae the love of a captain to his soldiers,"who are so foolish,
so helples s in themselves,so oonf1d1ng,amd yet whose faith aloe
makes Him possible".
We not e t hat Wells us es theological terrninology after the accepted fashion with premeditated and telling effect. His God nevertheles s lea ves us with a sense of unsatisfied vagueness. We have,it
seems,been listening to a lagtl of abstractions and metaphysical hypot heses and know nothing of the es sence of the Britisher's God other
than t hat his maker wishes him to be non-Christian. Let us, therefore,
viev, thi s God. as a cog i n the cosmogony which Vielle outlines in the
chapter entttled THE I NVISIBLE KING,this being the keystone chapter
of the book. We e,re teinpted to say in advance that the author here
des cribes a Utopia utterly_ incompatible with human experience. Wells'
dream has been the dream of every false religion,for he presenta the
world a s it s hould be ideally,but as i t never can be practically. He
hopes ,however,that " modern religion1 will make it such since all othershave failed; and in reviewing hms p~ition he unwittingly falls

"

into the bias of t he millenialists. He dreams anew what,to some extent,Plato,Confucius,Brahma,Origin,Tauler sad Spener dreamed before
him in vain. The outline of his cosmogony,however,helpa us to view
his God a bit more realistically.
As we observed above,God 1s finite in this world. He "faces
the blackness of the unknown and the blind joys and confusions and
cruelties of life,as one who leads mankind through a dark jungle to
a great conquest". uan,that ia,of course,the believer,is God's servant who completely renounces himself in the service of God. The
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the raoe, ••.. the petty death of ind.olence,insuffienoy,ba;eneea,mie0Onception,and perversion". God fights (Wells stresses the incongruity between God llilitant and the non-resisting Crucified Christ),and
he fi ghts to effect a kingdom which is to be

11

a peaceful and coordi-

nated activity of all mankind upon certain divine ends". These divine ends a re the following:
11 These,t e conceive,are first,tbe maintenance of the racial life;
secondly,the exploration of the external being of nature as it is
and as it ha s b een,that is to say history and science; thirdly,that
exploration of inh erent human possibility which is art; fourthly,
that clarification of thought and knowledge which is philosophy; "8,nd
finally,th e pr ogressive enlargement and developement of the racial
life u.1 der t hese lifflts, so that God may work through a continually
better body of humanity and through- better and better equipped minds,
that he and our race may increase for ever, worlcing unendingly upon
the d evelopement of t he powers of life and the mastery of the blind
forces of matter t hroughout the deeps of space. He sets out with
us, we are p ersua.ded, to conquer our~elves and our world and the stars. n

{p-p .107f.)

The part t h ich the believer plays as the servant of God is
summed ·up i n t h e

ords:

11

Service,a11d service alone,is the criterion

that t h e quickened conscience shall recognize". And,since God is
open to al l rnen,the quickened conscience of man must reach to the
noble vork ,hi ch the milita nt GQd wishes to ef fect in hie t heooracy.
And,as wa.s noted p reviously,the "finding of Him is salvation from
the pur.9oselessne s s of life 11 •
In t h is connection,as a conclusion,we wish to present Wells•
justification for tne revudiation of creeds. It is consistent with
his entire t eogony,BU1a c king as it does of harsh utilitarianism. He
states,namely.tbat "the service of God is not to achieve e delicate
consistency of statemnt (sicl); it is to do as much as one can of
God's '7ork11 • (p.126).
As wa~ indicated earlier,Wells can hardly be reckoned as a
yhilosopher,and in his conception of God one might almost accuse
him of being a religious charlatan. GOD,THE INVISIBLE KING is a
hodge-podge of sectarian new revelation and religious experience
combined with the finite God of Wm.James and a work righteousness
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which is balm to the hearts of the sa.J'itts.
\':ells' God was invented
II,
as a convenience for the man-about-town of the 20th Oentury,and

its depth and sincerity are commensurate with its origin. In shelving the "philosopher V/ells11 , we are reminded

oJ

the caustic com-

ment of Edwa r d Shanks, who,in contrasting the relative merits of
Gal~worthy and ~·ells as contemporary Enlish men-of-letters,said:
nMr.Oa lsworthy i s a creat ive artist who,however hard he has tried
to be s omet hing elee,has failed; Mr.Wells was a creative artist
who t ri ed t o become sor.1ething else and did so. 11

In bri gi ne; t o a close our discussion of the conception of
God in moder n ph iloso!)hy, we must confess tha.t we feel that we
have not a t tai ned the goal of our thesis; for the conception of
God in moder n philosophy. does not exist,as such. The variety of
t he conc epti ons of God among philosophers is so diversified as to
admit of no s ynt he s is except a few generalities. The treatment of
the syecific phi lospphers in our pap er verifies this statement,
for t he width of t he world lies between the sharply dialectic concept ion of . oyce,the pluralistic conceptions of Bergson and James,
a.nd t he :p ur ely fictive deity of Wells.
We mi ght,however, d ivide the philosophies which we have conconve ntional
sidered und er t wo/heads,narnely,the a priori~ype of which Royce is
an able exyonent, a nd the a posteriori type which includes Bergson,
James and !ells. A number of general objections have be~n levelled
against both,which,in conclusion,we should like to diaousa.
The a nriori school ;s,as we know,essentially deductive and
reasons a cosmogony which is ideal,as Royce has done. But the sbarpest thorn in the side of such a system is the problem of evil. In
our discussion of the philosophy of James we treated at some length
James••repudiation of Absolute Idealism because of its failure to
solve the problem of evil satisfactorily; for who,eays James,oan

29.
be satisfied with the explanation that the evil in this world is
not really evil but merely an appearance of evil which is justified
as a part of the perf ect whole~ James has quite correctly stated
the g eneral obj~ct.ion which still offers dif:ficulty to t he exponents
of the a nriori school. It has also been held that God and the Abaolute cannot be ha r monized,because,while the Absolute alone is Reality ~nd f i nite b eing s

II

appea.rances11 ,man in his fini tude carries

over these liuiitations to his conception of God,who is,as a result,
merely

11

a fi nit e and human conception formed on the level of appea-

rances, a.nd is not absolutely truen. For practical purposes,however,
it ha s been a.gr eed t hat such a conception of God may be logically
consi st ent with the Absolute;and,hence,the conception of the Absolute i s fr equently held to b e poss ible of harmonization with the
Christian conception.

a t h r ega,r d to the a tJosteriori thinkers, a number of very
serious objections have been r a.ised,particularly becau.ae: GJf the
gr eat diver g ence of t his school of t hought from the traditional.
concept i on of a God who is infinite and unchanging. Dr.L.Frank1in
Gruber of Aayv1ood (Ill.) treat s the subject quite extensively in
t wo tracts published in the BIBLIOTHEOA SACHA (Oct.,1918) and THE
LUTHERA:· QUARTERLY (Jan. ,1921) and has very satisfactorily listed
the g eneral objections. He regards Bergson's philosoph~ as being
the starting point for the tpeory of a finite God and emphasizes
the fact that,although Bergson has not definitely identitied his
Vital Impulse with God,his disciples have done so,as for example,
James and after him Wells. Assuming that the universe is developing
through the process of creative evolution,Dr.Gruber asks,what bas
that to do with God? Experiential philosophy cannot ipso facto
fathom transcendental problems,and the great fallacy of the Bergsonian view lies in the fact that it includes God in the universe
\

and then tries tcj<iefine Him a la creative evolution. No,says Gruber,

for, even a ssuming creative evolution t.o be a ~ct together with its
concomitant, the Vital Impulse, what prevents one from regarding them
as mere modi onerandi of God? Evolution is finite because it works
with a Xature created finite. Is it not a fact that God is included
in the universe,in Nature,a priori and not &Jpost•r~eri according
to this sytem,and then p roved finite? And it does not at all f ollow
that, because t he · Cr eation is finite,the Creator is likwise finite.
The v ery contary i s true,for a petitio orincipii exists in the

-.

denial of an i nf inite since this conoeut is already suggested in

!

the conc ept

11

f inite 11 • Furt hermore,according to Gruber,this school

of philosophy stresses too much t be evil in the world. They hold
t ha~. God must be finLte because of all the evil roundabout since
an ~mnipot ent,oni s cient God could not include evil in his essence,
but t he y ner,;l ect t o consider the fa.ct that limited,finite man reads
limitati ons a.l so i nt o Mature. (Mote t he similarity between the
reasoning gf Dr. Gruber and Prof.Royce). And ma.n,as an agent created
morally f ree,is a lone responsible for sin. Finally,acoording to
Gruber, i mper fectiotj. in l~~ture 1nay be expla.ineafas merely evil appearances of t he perfect whole a ccording to the logic of the Absolute
Ideali s te, a nd Dr.Gruber ~ ives fresh significance to this statement,
and incid ent a lly a d istinct snub to Bergsonians,by maintaining that

this view i s all the more tenable ~hen considered in the ebb am
flow of creative evolu tion. The idea of an infinite and unchangeing
God is tenable from reason as well as Scripture in the opinion of
this learned and scientific Lutheran apologist,ahd the great doctrines of redemption,incarnation and atonement are consistent with
it.
Thus we see that the systems which we have treated are open
to a number of serious objections from the view-point of reason.
We shall also see,however,tha.t a greater objection holds. Although
differing widely in a number of pointa,all four systems agree per-

~~-.---------------------~
fectly in one point, and that is the fact that they speculate a God.
And herein lies their irreconcilability with Christianity.
The Christia n God is the God of revelation. He cannot be induced froni the facts of nature and life; the facts of nature and
life must,instead, be interpreted according to the God Who revealed
the fact t hat He has created and still preserves them. It seems,
therefore,to t he 'l.7riter that,no matter whether a man be an orthodox Christi an or a purely materialistic pagan,he cannot fail to see
that t he ,od of Ch riet iane and the God of philosophy must,by their
very origin, be i ncompatible. The attempt of Prof.lliller to interpret Berg s on•s conception, and the similar attempt of Prof.Floumoy
to i nt er pret J a.mes, a s being compatible with Christian theism must,
as a consequ ence,be termed failures.
\"'e do not doubt t hat a harmonization between the two conceptions i s possi ble in a g eneral way. And i n this connection we might
urge t he apologetic va lue of the study of philosophy. Natural man
has a vague knowl edge of God,according to Scripturea,and philosophy
substantia tes this. It does not,however,follow that ergo,the God
Whom t h ey ha ve speculated ie. the Christian God. In the first place,
as was sta ted above,their ~od is the God of speculation; their religion is that of experience,the inner light,character and aalw.tion
through self. And in the second place,their aystema make no roan
for Christ the s aviour. To them He is little more than the sage Oonfuc~ius. The doctrine of the vicarious satisfaction and justification they repudiate in favor of a religion of works which satisfies
the guilty conscience of natural man. How then oan a person who ·
understands the Lutheran oonfessiona,whether he be believer orunbeliever,maintain t hat these two opposite oonoeptiona,the.t of the
Christian and tbat of the philoaopher,are compatible? There may
be traces of similarity; but compatibility ia utterly out of the
question.

E. Vl.Lyman in THEOLOGY AND HU!!AN PROBLEMS (p.21),in speakizg
of the God of one of these systems,that of the Absolute Idealists,
states the -problem very clearly:
"As one contert1plates t h e idea of t he timeless Absolute in its
strict meaning---and especially as one regards it from the standpoint of the ethica~life with its constant activity in the production of sp iritual goods---it loses all power to call forth ourworship, and. appea rs like a hug e,spherical aquarium encomP,;uassing within
itself motion and life,but as a whole rigid,glassy an otionlesa.
surely the ti~eles s Ab solute is not the supreme so+ve of human
problems,nor the God to whose worship we should summon the aspiring
and struggling sons of men. 11
And whet her God is considered as tiraeless or as finite is

not

of decisive i mport a nce in rendering the verdict against philosophy,
for to t h e writer the Gods of all philosophic systems fit the descripted quoted above. Disciples of Bergson and ·James,and Royce and Wells
themselves have a t t empted to identify their conceptions of God with
t he Chri stian conception,but we believe this to be logically impossible, as i de f r om a ll minor di f ficulties in the desired harmonization
process, a lone f r om t he f a ct that a God who is the product of speculation ca nnot i pso f a cto be compatible with the God of revelation.
And as a fi nal thought stres s ing the gulf between religionpnd philosophy, we shoul d like to cite the words which a friend 1\9s written as
a conclusion to t lle reading of Will Durant I s THE STORY OF PHILOSOPHY.
On the fly-leaf of his volume we find the following_ very adequate
words:
"As I read tonight in old St.Louia,listening to the dripping
of the r a in from the eaves,I seek a picture that will give my impression of the voices of these iovers of wisdom. The picture is ready
to hand,for through the open window come the harsh cries of a great
flock of wild ducks fl-ying south away from the Canadian chill. They
make t heir way t hr ough the dreary,darnp sky with no star or moon for
comfort a nd guidance. They fly in a great V,all aiming for the genial
Southern waters,as philosophers seek for truth. But the tragedy is
here that the unerring instinct which guides the birds aright,and
which mi ght guide the philosophers if they would fly by faith and
not by reason,has been lost to the philosophic world when it discarded the oracles of God. The wise of this world,decoyed by their own
exceeding wisdom,are an easy bag for Satan•s hunting."
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